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Abstract Economics influences how medical care is
delivered, organized, and progresses. Fee-for-service pay-
ment encourages delivery of services. Fee-for-individual-
service, however, offers no incentives for clinicians to
efficiently organize the care their patients need. Global
capitation provides such incentives; it works well in highly
integrated practices but not for independent practitioners.
The failures of utilization management in the 1990s dem-
onstrated the need for a third alternative to better align
incentives, such as bundling payment for an episode of
care. Building on Medicare’s approach to hospital pay-
ment, one can define expanded diagnosis-related groups
that include all hospital, physician, and other costs during
the stay and appropriate preadmission and postdischarge
periods. Physicians and hospitals voluntarily forming a
new entity (a care delivery team) would receive such
bundled payments along with complete flexibility in allo-
cating the funds. Modifications to gainsharing and
antikickback rules, as well as reforms to malpractice lia-
bility laws, will facilitate the functioning of the care
delivery teams. The implicit financial incentives encourage
efficient care for the patient; the episode focus will facili-
tate measuring patient outcomes. Payment can be based on
the resources used by those care delivery teams achieving
superior outcomes, thereby fostering innovation improving
outcomes and reducing waste.
Introduction
Economics, in addition to medical research, influences how
medical care is delivered, organized, and progresses. Fee-
for-service (FFS) payment encourages the delivery of ser-
vices; given the current payment structure, time spent
doing procedures is rewarded more highly than time with
patients or coordinating care. Some argue these relative
payments should be adjusted; shifting that balance, how-
ever, will differentially affect various specialties. The
concern of this discussion, however, is different: regardless
of the relative values for evaluation and management
versus procedural services, the prevailing system of fee-
for-individual-service offers no economic incentives for
clinicians to efficiently organize the care delivered by other
providers.
This paper discusses the role of payment incentives and
how realignment of payment can improve both efficiency
and quality at any point in time and, furthermore, reduce
the rate of growth in expenditures. The focus here is not on
payment levels—providers typically complain fees are too
low and payors complain they are too high—but rather on
the way that payment is structured. One alternative to fee-
for-service, global capitation, provides cost-containing
incentives because it gives decision makers a fixed budget
for all the care their enrollees need. It works well in
highly integrated practices but not for independent practi-
tioners without an external entity to coordinate their care.
The failures of utilization management in the managed
care efforts of the 1990s demonstrated the need for an
alternative approach. Episode-based payment is such an
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alternative to FFS on the one hand and global capitation on
the other.
Bundling together all the payments associated with an
episode of care can better align incentives. Building on
Medicare’s model for hospital payment, one can define
new expanded diagnosis-related groups (EDRGs) includ-
ing not just hospital costs, but also physician and other
costs during the stay and during appropriate preadmission
and postdischarge periods. Physicians and hospitals vol-
untarily forming an entity I will call a care delivery team
(CDT) would receive a bundled payment, along with
complete flexibility in allocating the funds. The new
financial incentives will encourage efficient care for the
patient; the episode focus will facilitate measuring patient
outcomes. Payment levels, moreover, should be based on
the resources used by CDTs achieving superior outcomes,
thereby fostering innovation improving outcomes and
reducing waste in such care. Medicare has recently
begun a demonstration of selected aspects of this concept
for certain cardiovascular and joint replacement proce-
dures [2].
Restructuring payment for the ongoing management of
chronic illnesses is more complex than the much shorter
and more concentrated care associated with an inpatient
episode. In brief, for the former I propose a comprehensive
approach with monthly chronic illness management pay-
ments to accounts associated with primary care physicians.
These payments will be risk-adjusted to reflect the chronic
conditions of the physicians’ patients, and reflect the
resources used by those clinicians achieving better than
average outcomes for their patients. A major risk pool will
pay the CDTs directly for hospital and similar episodes, so
the chronic illness management payments need not include
those costs. A payment intermediary working on behalf of
the primary care physicians will monitor the data and, for
those whose patients have lower use of inpatient care but
comparable or better outcomes, argue that they should
receive higher monthly payments for their superior man-
agement of care. The monthly payments serve as the basis
for paying not just the primary care physician, but also
specialists and other ambulatory care services. The com-
prehensive approach includes methods to ensure enroll-
ment, the sharing of data, and creation of information
useful to both patients and clinicians [5].
The first section of this paper outlines several ways
payment can be structured, from the perspectives of how
dollars are disbursed by payors and how they are received
by providers. The second expands on one of these options,
payment from a payor bundled around an inpatient episode,
and discusses how funds may be disbursed among the
providers involved in the episode. The third section illus-
trates this concept with data concerning knee arthroplasty
procedures. A final section discusses the likely implications
of such a payment scheme on efficiency, quality, and long-
term cost growth.
Payment and Incentives
Healthcare providers (meaning both physicians and hos-
pitals) often use the term ‘‘reimbursement’’ for their
services, but this is a misnomer. Reimbursement actually
refers to situations in which one is paid back for money
spent on an official or approved purpose. For example, I
trusted the sponsors of this workshop would reimburse my
travel expenses upon presentation of the appropriate
receipts. They would, however, impose certain constraints,
such as reimbursing only up to full coach airfare if I chose
to fly first class. On the other hand, they would not pay me
the price of a full coach ticket if I purchased a nonre-
fundable, discounted ticket using a roundabout route. That
would be akin to offering me a fixed allowance to cover all
travel expenses, thereby shifting the risk and potential
benefits to me. A fixed travel allowance would give me
incentives to search for cheaper airfares (perhaps freeing
up funds for an honorarium), but it would also force me to
bear the risk of occasionally absorbing the expenses of
nonrefundable tickets for trips that had to be cancelled.
Providers prefer to talk about ‘‘reimbursement’’ for at
least two reasons, one historical and the other political. The
historical reason is that hospitals used to have contracts
with Blue Cross plans (and for a number of years, Medi-
care) in which they kept track of the proportion of their
patients attributed to these payors and at the end of the year
were literally reimbursed for that share of their allowable
costs. The political reason is that ‘‘reimbursement’’ sug-
gests merely being paid back for expenses incurred—the
‘‘language’’ implies no one is making a profit.
In fact, there is very little true ‘‘reimbursement’’ these
days. Hospitals set charges and negotiate rates with private
insurers. Payments are often above actual costs incurred; if
not, the facility would eventually go bankrupt. Medicare
sets the payments it offers hospitals and typically does not
care whether these payments cover the costs of its
patients—it is like a fixed travel allowance based on the
destination of the traveler. Medicare payments to physi-
cians are also set unilaterally, but those payments are based
on each unit of service, as if I were allowed a fixed amount
for each airline trip, each taxi ride, and each meal. In both
instances, there are vigorous arguments over the adequacy
of the payments, but little discussion as to the effects of
how the payments are structured.
FFS payment to providers is the most common approach
to structuring payment. FFS generates some revenue for
nearly every service provided; depending on the costs of
delivering those services, providers may make or lose
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money. There are some variable costs involved (such as
supplies), but medical practice has substantial fixed costs,
reflecting rent and depreciation, as well as malpractice
insurance, office staff, and operations. The individual
physician is usually the residual claimant; his or her
income is based on what is left after all the costs are
subtracted from the revenue received. High fixed costs
mean additional services rendered are likely to be profit-
able even if on average the revenue received is less than the
average cost. In economic terms, this means the marginal
(or incremental) revenue exceeds marginal (or incremental)
costs associated with one additional service rendered.
Incentive effects, or the additional effort one will expend in
a given situation, usually reflect such incremental revenues
and costs. Thus, FFS creates incentives to provide more
services. This is not necessarily problematic; the vast
majority of businesses have incentives to offer more of
whatever they sell.
Applying these incentives in the context of medical care,
however, is problematic because of what is being ‘‘sold’’ or
‘‘purchased.’’ Physicians sell specific highly skilled ser-
vices, hospitals sell operating room time and bed days,
pharmacies sell drugs, and device manufacturers sell
devices. Most patients, however, want a treatment for their
health problem or ongoing care to keep them healthy. In
this context, the specific services and items provided by
practitioners are simply inputs. While patients often have
(or should have) substantial say in decisions about their
care, they rarely have the technical expertise to assess the
value of specific inputs in achieving a desired outcome.
If a patient needs a surgical procedure, such as for a
knee arthroplasty to improve mobility, the patient typically
selects the surgeon who decides on the best technical
approach. The hospital provides the inpatient services and
arranges for the anesthesiologist and the implant. If the
system works reasonably well, nothing goes wrong and
the procedure is a success. There is nothing, however, in
the simple incentives of FFS payment that drives the
overall process to become more efficient or produce better
quality. For example, the instruments and approach a par-
ticular surgeon prefers may be optimal for him or her, but if
each surgeon uses a different approach, the operating room
team does not have the opportunity to standardize proce-
dures to reduce waste and errors.
A useful, although not perfect, analogy is what happens
when undertaking a kitchen remodel. The initial decision
as to whether to go forward with the project is based on the
homeowner’s assessment of the benefits and costs
involved. In a kitchen remodel situation, some people
decide to serve as their own general contractors, hiring
specialists to do specific jobs and coordinating the sched-
uling. Unless very experienced however, the do-it-yourself
general contractor often runs into problems: the floor
refinisher wants to be last, but the painter wants to do the
baseboards last. General contractors earn their fees both for
ensuring seamless coordination and for their expertise in
choosing subcontractors who will perform as expected. The
subcontractors know failure to perform will affect repeat
business, not from the current client, but from the general
contractor who needs reliable subcontractors and can offer
many jobs in the future.
The problem with the general contractor-subcontractor
model is since subcontractors are often working for several
general contactors, scheduling cannot be fully integrated
and each subcontractor’s slightly different work style may
not mesh well with others. A few companies, however, are
fully integrated; their own crews do all the electrical,
plumbing, countertop, and other work. Being able to con-
trol everything, they prepare all the materials well in
advance in the warehouse and then gut the kitchen and
install everything in a week of on-site work. They reduce
labor costs for initial steps by having workers move from
one ‘‘job’’ to another in the warehouse in the same day. The
firm, however, has to bear the risk of having staff on the
payroll even when demand slacks off. From the perspective
of anyone who has lived through a remodel, the promise of
a job completed in a week and on budget is very attractive
and this may offset a somewhat higher bid price.
We rarely see either of these contracting arrangements
in medical care. Although a hospital may hire nursing and
other staff and facilitate access to certain hospital-based
physicians, such as radiologists, anesthesiologists, and
pathologists, each physician typically acts as an indepen-
dent provider. One physician may ‘‘manage’’ the clinical
aspects of the case, but he or she cannot pay the others to
change their schedules, agree on a practice approach, or
otherwise coordinate their activities. Various laws and
regulations preclude such financial interconnections. Even
in the unusual situations in which physicians are employed
by the same entity, such as a medical school, a history of
specialty independence and prerogatives usually trumps
economic integration.
Bundling Payment for Inpatient Care Episodes
What might a new model of integration for inpatient care
look like? The new system would pay for an episode of
care, such as a knee arthroplasty or care for a heart attack.
These are events a patient can understand, rather than the
long list of services, disposables, and devices used in
delivering the care. Although I refer to inpatient care, I
include similar episodes addressed in an outpatient setting;
a procedure involving a 23-hour stay is not much different
to the patient from one that extends to 25 hours. The epi-
sode should include closely related preadmission services,
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such as an MRI performed 1 day before a procedure or the
emergency room visit ending in the heart attack admission.
Likewise, reasonable postdischarge care should be
included, including costs due to complications.
One’s initial reaction may be that such a system could
not work because of various legal, political, and economic
risk-related reasons. These are discussed in turn. The legal
and regulatory barriers, such as those precluding fee-
splitting and gainsharing are changeable by new legisla-
tion; I will return later to legitimate concerns about the
troublesome conflicts of interest that could arise from
simply removing existing prohibitions.
The political barriers are less the ‘‘big P’’ political
issues any proposal might face in Congress, but those
arising between hospitals and their medical staffs. There
is often little trust between hospitals and their affiliated
physicians. Although the hospital accounts for the largest
share of expenses within most episodes, there is no reason
for it to be the recipient of the payment. Instead, the
bundled payment could be offered only to a new entity
able and willing to provide (or assure the provision of) all
the services needed for the episode. Legislation altering
existing gainsharing regulations could require that any
such new entity establish its own forms of governance
acceptable to its members. A hospital could threaten to
replace individual physicians, but it will not be able to
establish such a new entity on its own. Because most
patients seek out physicians and surgeons, not hospitals,
this will encourage win-win arrangements. The new
governance rules could be written by the participants with
an appropriate balance of power between the hospital on
the one hand and the participating physicians on the other.
Not all physicians on a medical staff will want (or need)
to participate in the entity; just enough are required for
the new entity to reasonably accept episode-based pay-
ments. Avoiding an ‘‘all-or-none’’ situation reduces the
power of a single physician to block the deal. CDTs
might initially be encouraged under an expansion of
Medicare’s demonstration authority to offer bundled
payments to the voluntarily formed new entities. The
amount might be no less than that paid under existing Part
A and B coverage and be guaranteed not to decline even
if there are fee schedule reductions in the future. Teach-
ing hospitals creating CDTs will avoid the cumbersome
reporting and documentation requirements of the house
staff and attending roles in each patient’s care. The new
CDT acts as the general contactor accepting a fixed price
for the remodel and arranging for and paying the various
subcontractors needed to complete the job. A hospital
might participate in several separate CDTs, such as for
cardiovascular or orthopaedic care. Alternatively, there
may just be one CDT with varying arrangements with
participating physicians.
The economic risk concerns arise from the nature of a
bundled payment to the CDT. Even within a specific
diagnosis-related group (DRG), costs vary across patients
in the same hospital. Including responsibility for compli-
cations within a reasonable period of time substantially
increases that variability; ignoring complications, however,
eliminates economic incentives to avoid them. The CDT’s
financial risk can be addressed through reinsurance. The
post-discharge responsibility period may be DRG-specific
and should maximize the likelihood that readmissions are
associated with the CDT’s care, rather than the patient’s
underlying medical problems or poor care in the ambula-
tory setting. For example, a longer window may be
appropriate for admissions of basically healthy people
undergoing a joint replacement or delivering a baby, while
only a short period would be used for a person with a
naturally recurring problem, such as CHF or emphysema.
In some instances a readmission is clearly a complication
of care, such as a wound infection with a hospital-specific
strain of MRSA. In other instances, the readmission is
almost certainly unrelated, such as for a post-discharge
gunshot wound. Most readmissions have less clear causes.
Across many patients with a given initial reason for
admission, however, one can readily estimate the percent-
age readmitted within a specific period of time for any
reason. That percentage times the average cost of those
readmissions is the amount that would be added to the
payment to the CDT to cover, on average, the cost of
readmissions.
Medicare already absorbs some similar episode-based
risk with outlier payments for individual hospital admis-
sions that are substantially more costly than the specific
DRG payment. An alternative approach can offer more
direct incentives for process improvements. The payment
to the CDT would include the average cost of a reinsurance
policy protecting the CDT from the risk associated with
unusually expensive cases. For example, if outlier cases
and readmissions currently account for 10% of all costs
associated with a specific DRG, the payment could be
increased by a bit over 10% (to allow for the legitimate
costs of the reinsurer) and CDTs could purchase coverage
on their own. Reinsurers will have an interest in keeping
down such costs and will seek to learn the techniques used
by CDTs able to reduce occurrences of complications, or
manage them very well once they occur. Reinsurers can go
beyond merely selecting CDTs with low complication
rates; some will learn best practice techniques from their
clients and pass them on to those CDTs wanting to improve
their processes. In contrast, the current Medicare system
provides neither incentives nor mechanisms to learn and
disseminate better techniques.
The notion of bringing together hospitals and physicians
in an economically aligned unit is not new; it is part of
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what underlies the concept of ‘‘focused factories’’ for
orthopaedic and cardiovascular services [3]. Such specialty
hospitals are very attractive in some circles but strongly
opposed in others. The interest in them indicates the
technical and internal political issues to make them work
can be overcome. The opposition arises from two general
concerns. The first is, by specializing in certain highly
profitable categories of care and by drawing those patients
out of other hospitals, they impair the ability of the latter to
cross-subsidize patients who are less profitable. The second
is they may encourage admissions and procedures that are
not necessary.
The first problem is merely a reflection of the current
Medicare DRG rates; they are too high for some proce-
dures and too low for many other categories. This is a
problem of how those prices are set rather than the
underlying concept of bundling; the new severity-adjusted
rates implemented by Medicare are designed to address this
problem. In a reformed system, prices for each inpatient
episode (including all professional and facility costs, plus
the appropriate preadmission and postdischarge care)
should yield roughly the same profit (or net revenue)
margin for each EDRG category. With the need for cross-
subsidies eliminated, the first argument against specialized
facilities will disappear. Some will object that simply
having appropriate pricing of EDRGs, however, does not
eliminate the need for cross-subsidies to cover the unin-
sured. That is a legitimate point if the discussion is
focusing only on a specific payor, such as Medicare, but
can be addressed by universal coverage for such care, as
outlined in my proposal for comprehensive reform [5].
Appropriately setting prices for bundled payment is not
trivial, but doing it well can yield several benefits. Medi-
care currently sets relative DRG weights based largely on
the costs nationally of caring for patients in each DRG
category with adjustments to reflect local input prices. The
final figures are then subject to across-the-board adjust-
ments to meet certain budgetary goals and hence reflect
high-level political lobbying. A different approach would
use not the national average as the standard, but the costs
incurred by those CDTs achieving better than average
outcomes for their patients, again adjusting for local wage
rates. (The focus here is on relatively proximate outcomes,
eg, unexpected complications or achieving anticipated
functional levels within 6 months. Long-term outcomes,
such as graft patency or device longevity, probably reflect
more the choice of intervention than the skill of the CDT.)
In contrast to most current attempts to reward quality that
focus on either hard endpoints, such as mortality, or
adherence to professionally determined processes, the
choice of outcome measures should be more patient-ori-
ented. That is, panels should be established with substantial
patient input to identify the outcomes patients desire most.
Clinicians will then be able to experiment with new pro-
cesses to improve outcomes and reduce costs. Total
payments, moreover, should not be constrained to meet an
overall budget. We should instead rely on the incentives
inherent in bundled payments to reduce the inputs used in
an episode; other market-based incentives to address the
prices for physician time are discussed elsewhere [5].
A commitment to set payments based on what it takes to
achieve superior outcomes will increase demand by phy-
sicians for collection of better data on outcomes. It will
also lead to improving risk adjustment techniques to
account for underlying patient comorbidities and under-
standing what techniques lead to the best outcomes. This
will foster innovation in workflow and processes that
increase quality. The new system should also explicitly
cover the additional costs of new treatments as they are
being assessed, much as Medicare offers such coverage
with evidence determination. Better outcomes at specific
CDTs will result in not just professional and public rec-
ognition (thereby attracting referrals) but also in an
increased payment level for all, as the new interventions
are included in the costs reported by the CDTs achieving
superior outcomes.
The problem of demand creation—the classic example
being that of Redding Hospital (Redding, CA) and its car-
diovascular team who performed procedures on patients
who did not need them—must also be addressed [4]. Phy-
sicians choosing to be part of a CDT cannot be in the
position to self-refer by deciding that a certain patient needs
a procedure or admission. Clinicians financially involved
with the CDT should not be assessing the need for an
admission, but in many instances primary care physicians
will not have the technical expertise to make such decisions.
Independent specialists doing those assessments can be
compensated based on their time and expenses, without
rewards for decisions to either intervene or withhold care.
Once it has been determined a procedure or admission is
warranted, patients will have free choice of CDT teams and
physicians within CDTs. The CDT members can certainly
decide not to undertake a procedure on a given patient.
Physicians not part of a CDT, however, can be involved in
the outpatient management of care and in the decisions of
whether an admission or a procedure is needed. Primary
care physicians and independent medical evaluators outside
the CDT may have important insights on the care of patients
and the CDT would be able to pay them a fee comparable to
their time in the office for consultations.
An Illustration
To illustrate the potential of bundled payments, we use data
for patients undergoing knee arthroplasties during 2003 to
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2004 drawn from enrollees in a set of large commercial
health plans across the nation. These unpublished data
came from the proprietary Ingenix Impact National
Managed Care Database which is a large administrative
claims database containing inpatient confinement, medical
claims, pharmacy claims, and member eligibility infor-
mation. For this illustration, we used a 10% random sample
(over 800,000 members from numerous national health
plans during 2003–04). Of these, 284,446 members had
24 months of continuous commercial (non-Medicare)
coverage and 4,910 had knee surgery. (The database is
fully deidentified in compliance with HIPAA Privacy
Rules.) The database includes some people aged 65 years
and over covered primarily through employer-based plans
rather than Medicare. The dollar amounts reflect ‘‘allowed
charges’’ as paid by the plans and patients. We used the
Ingenix Symmetry Episode Grouper 6.5 to create episodes
of care, but focus only on the services during and proxi-
mate to a hospital admission. Patients were selected if they
had a knee arthroplasty (CPT-4 code 27447) with a phy-
sician identified as an orthopaedic surgeon. We excluded a
small number (95) of persons with more than one knee
arthroplasty in a year because we could not determine
whether the code reflected complications of the index knee
operation rather than surgery on the other knee. We only
included patients grouped into ETG 0721 (joint degenera-
tion, localized, with surgery-knee and lower leg) for the
knee arthroplasty group. We examined costs by various
types of service and those delivered either during the
inpatient stay or in the period before or after admission.
The mean episode cost across all 4910 patients was
$22,454, with an average of $18,596 incurred during the
inpatient stay and the remainder during preadmission and
postdischarge periods, including rehabilitation stays. Not
all patients incur charges in all categories, and some
charges are seen for only a small fraction of all patients
(Table 1). The total cost is rather stable, with a coefficient
of variation of 37%, indicating the standard deviation is a
little more than 1
.
3 of the mean. Nearly all episodes include
charges for hospital, anesthesiologist, and ancillary costs,
along with surgeon fees. Hospital costs averaged $13,189,
nearly 60% of the total, whereas surgeon fees during the
episode averaged $2948, or about 13% of the total. Total
ancillary fees exceed surgeon fees but with a coefficient of
variation nearly three times as large.
Without detailed clinical information, it is impossible to
know whether the variability in resource use across patient
episodes is due simply to underlying patient factors. The
widely documented variability in resource use across
geographic areas and individual medical centers without
any clear evidence in similar differences in patient risk,
however, suggests patient factors may not fully account for
what we see. (See, for example, discussions by Jon Lurie
[6] in this issue.) There is little evidence that areas or
centers with consistently higher resource use achieve better
patient outcomes. In the absence of compelling new
information, we should modify the usual baseline in which
it is assumed (1) most variation is due to patient risk fac-
tors, and (2) increased resource use controlling for patient
risk factors is indicative of higher quality. Instead, our
Table 1. Costs for various services incurred during knee arthroplasty episodes of care commercially insured patients, 2003 to 2004
Costs during inpatient stays (acute only) Cost preadmission and postdischarge
(including rehabilitation stays)





























Surgeon fees 4910 $2685 56.3% $2685 4273 $302 146.1% $263 $2948 13.1% 53.4%
Inpatient facility
costs
4910 $13,189 38.6% $13,189 0 $0 $0 $13,189 58.7% 38.6%
Anesthesiologist
fees




2213 $395 133.9% $178 3713 $636 154.1% $481 $659 2.9% 169%
Ancillary costs 4496 $2065 212.7% $1891 4867 $1440 113.4% $1428 $3319 14.8% 141.2%
Rehabilitation
facility costs




0 $0 $0 3509 $431 151.8% $308 $308 1.4% 212.4%
Total costs 4910 $18,596 4899 $3866 111.3% $3858 $22,454 100% 37%
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baseline should be (1) the extent of patient-specific need
must be measured with better clinical data, and (2) out-
comes should be continually assessed to determine what
mixes of inputs and services are best for specific patient
problems.
The potential for creative resource allocation is appar-
ent; a relatively small reduction in hospital costs could
allow substantially increased compensation for other
members of a CDT (Table 1). Such a saving in hospital
costs, however, is likely to require adaptations by nursing
staff, anesthesiologists, and others involved in the episode.
These solutions cannot be easily imposed by external
bodies but are likely to be achieved voluntarily by the new
CDTs with the flexibility to allocate funds. Ancillary costs
exceed surgeon fees but are usually ordered by the sur-
geons; they could also be a source of savings. CDTs
choosing to share some of their savings with price-sensitive
patients may increase their volume, and hence total reve-
nue, at the expense of other, less efficient CDTs.
Discussion
There is much concern about how much we spend on
medical care and how uneven is the quality of care we get,
but little attention has been paid to the implications of how
we pay medical care providers. The current system of fees
for individual services is at the root of both our cost and
quality problems. The incentives implicit in a bundled
payment covering all the relevant providers involved in an
inpatient episode can encourage far more efficiency. If
designed appropriately, such a payment approach can also
facilitate learning what works best in practice and then
changing processes to improve quality. In the long run, this
new focus will impact the translation of new research into
practice, emphasizing increased efficiency and improved
value.
The conceptual arguments in favor of episode-based
payments are clear; the details and transition are more
challenging. Episode-based payments and bundling are far
more complex in the outpatient setting for numerous rea-
sons, so this discussion has focused on inpatient (and
similarly intensive and short duration) care. It is easy for
payors to ‘‘bundle payment’’ but much harder for inde-
pendent practitioners and a hospital to figure out how to
share risk, rewards, and responsibilities among themselves.
With the fear of malpractice in the background, few pro-
viders will leap at the opportunity to redesign care in ways
that may appear to be ‘‘doing less,’’ so a reform of the
liability system must be considered. For a few categories of
conditions, such as acute myocardial infarction, there is a
reasonable consensus on outcomes, such as death within
30 days, that are reasonably well measured. For most
patients, such as those having elective surgery, procedure-
associated death should be a rare or never event. From the
patient perspective, outcomes matter most; not only should
each professional do his or her job excellently, but the
overall processes of the team members involved in the care
must facilitate ‘‘hand-offs,’’ optimal choices of treatments,
and continuous improvement. Developing agreed-upon
outcome measures incorporating both professional opinion
on what can be measured and patient values on what is
important will take time and resources. The model pro-
posed here focuses on quality measures across groups of
similar patients, with ample opportunity for increased risk
adjustment as we learn about relevant risk factors. Without
having to score each case as a ‘‘success or failure’’ one
can use robust statistical approaches that account for ran-
dom variation while seeking to detect consistently better
than expected performance. None of these issues are triv-
ial, but the best way to address them is to begin with
volunteering organizations, feasible target conditions, and
demonstrations.
Episode-based payment creates incentives for physi-
cians to focus on the best ways to manage resources during
an episode of illness or care; the CDT creates the economic
unit in which such incentives can be turned into action.
(The issues are somewhat more complicated in managing
an ongoing chronic illness involving a wide range of pro-
viders who may not normally work together and often
requiring patient cooperation in adherence to various
treatment regimens. Thus, different incentives and struc-
tures are needed for a relatively brief episode of care
focused on an inpatient stay and for the ongoing manage-
ment of illness. The latter are discussed in much more
detail in my comprehensive proposal [5].)
Episode-based payment allows the appropriate com-
pensation for the time professionals need to effectively
coordinate services. Payment approaches within the new
CDT may vary widely. Surgeons may still be paid per
procedure and anesthesiologists by the time in the operat-
ing room, while the hospitalists involved in the post-
operative care may be paid by the shift. The CDT may hire
patient navigators and technical support personnel to effi-
ciently coordinate all the members of the team or optimize
the use of various implants and instrumentation. Payment
rates, moreover, might be adjusted by workload to better
use scarce resources, such as encouraging the use of
operating room time during weekends.
The bundled payment that includes not just professional
fees, moreover, creates incentives to redesign workflow
within the inpatient stay and at other times during the
episode. This can range from relatively simple things,
such as standard preoperative protocols and drug regimens,
to agreeing on a smaller number of implants or a pre-
ferred formulary. While one cannot assume all imaging
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performed by referring clinicians meets the CDT’s stan-
dards, many may be perfectly adequate. CDTs might even
train referring clinicians in the techniques needed to reduce
the preadmission workup process—a savings not only in
resources but also in time and risk to the patient.
Episode-based payment must be designed to avoid
incentives to skimp on care to increase profits to the CDT.
Quality concerns, however, are not particularly associated
with episode-based payment, as illustrated by the tainted
medications derived from Chinese manufacturers [1].
There are always incentives for producers to skimp on
quality if it is not well monitored and if the losses due to
discovery are small relative to the gains for the badly
behaving producer. If we no longer assume more is nec-
essarily better, then paying for episodes means attention
will shift to the outcomes of episodes, a measure about
which patients care, rather than to the processes and inputs,
about which they have little technical knowledge. Using
independent medical evaluators outside the CDTs to assess
whether surgery is needed offers a useful approach. The
independent medical evaluators may also recommend
which CDTs have the best outcomes based on both risk-
adjusted outcome measures and reports gathered from the
patients seen.
Turning our focus to outcomes will initially be a chal-
lenge. Few meaningful measures are routinely captured in
administrative data other than events that should rarely
occur, such as death or serious complications. In most
instances, medical and surgical interventions are not
intended to postpone death but to enhance function and the
quality of life. These often require direct assessment by the
patients themselves. Such assessments should be viewed as
evaluating not the specific professionals involved but the
ability of the whole team to achieve the outcomes desired
by the patient and should recognize patients may differ in
what they think is important. Automobiles are not evalu-
ated in the market solely based on ‘‘hard end points,’’ such
as their crashworthiness and miles per gallon; customers
have varying preferences for style, reliability, and perfor-
mance. Highly unsafe cars should be kept off the road, but
there is room for a great deal of individuality in many other
aspects. Just as Road and Track and Consumer Reports
may rate the same cars differently, patients should be able
to choose among assessment schemes that match their own
preferences for certainty, performance, and processes.
Most healthcare professionals simply want to achieve
the best outcomes for their patients, but the fear of mal-
practice liability may lead some to perform unnecessary
tests and to be uneasy about the prospect of experimenting
with new ways of organizing and delivering care. Episode-
based payments to CDTs should be combined with reform
of the malpractice liability system that benefits patients,
providers, and even attorneys.
In brief, if an injury occurs due to an error in the care of
a patient, there should be a quick resolution with an
apology by members of a CDT and compensation paid to
the patient. Negligence will not need to be proven; the
payment is set through an administrative determination of a
preventable adverse event and the extent of the injury
sustained. (Medical care often involves inherent risks; no
compensation would be provided for unfortunate outcomes
without evidence of an error.) Plaintiffs’ attorneys would
simply collect and document the data supporting the claim
and probably be paid by the hour. Most CDTs would self-
insure for these common and relatively small claims. A
series of similar claims paid by the CDT without evidence
it attempted to improve its processes, however, could result
in a second-tier suit proving ‘‘corporate negligence’’ with a
much larger potential award. That award would be shared
with those patients (and their attorneys) involved in the
earlier claims who implicitly granted access to their data.
In this reformed system, patients would receive just com-
pensation for errors and CDTs would have incentives to
learn from previous mistakes, two legitimate arguments of
those defending the current system. Physicians would not
be charged with negligence for what was merely an error,
even if an avoidable one, and far less would be spent on
litigation, legitimate arguments of those opposing the
current system.
Episode-based payment creates immediate economic
incentives for teams to use resources more efficiently.
More important for the long term, it changes the incentives
for biomedical innovators. The current incentive is to
develop new medications, devices, and procedures with
some promise of improved quality of care, irrespective of
cost. For some innovations, their attractiveness is even
enhanced by additional professional fees associated with
their use; if physicians can earn an additional fee for the
procedure accompanying the biologic or device, they
effectively become part of the marketing team of the
manufacturer. In contrast, episode-based payment will lead
clinicians to consider all costs in relation to the enhance-
ment in quality. The most attractive innovations will be
those improving quality and reducing cost, even if this
means reducing what are now billable services. Other
innovations may have no measurable effect on quality but
will reduce costs; for instance, new technologies may allow
lower-skilled workers to substitute for some of the tasks
highly paid clinicians now do. With the cost of the device
bundled into the payment, surgeons will demand evidence
that ‘‘innovative’’ devices truly are better. Device manu-
facturers will find, unless they have breakthrough
technology with demonstrably better results, they will be
financially better off lowering the costs of tried-and-true
devices and gaining market share. The new incentives will,
therefore, alter the mix of technological innovations
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entering the healthcare system, slowing the long-term rate
of growth in expenditures.
Reform of the healthcare system needs to go beyond
strategies that simply provide more people with insurance
coverage that fosters inefficiency, poor quality through
disincentives for coordination, and mindless cost-contain-
ment efforts through fee reductions. Instead, reforms
should focus on improving the payment system to appro-
priately align incentives and facilitate clinicians in being
the best professionals they can be.
The charge for the Association of Bone and Joint Sur-
geons/C.T. Brighton Workshop is to discuss where we are
now, where we need to go, and how to get there. Nearly all
observers of the US healthcare system agree it fails to
cover a substantial fraction of the population and yet is
more expensive than all other systems in the developed
world. Most agree, while the quality of care in some
instances is outstanding, it is not as good as it can be. The
rate of growth in expenditures is unsustainable in the long
run and something needs to be done to slow this. Explicit
rationing of services is politically unacceptable. Reductions
in provider payments yield short-term cost containment,
but many believe the current system merely adapts by
increasing the use of services and procedures, further
fueling expenditure growth while devaluing physician
effort and driving many clinicians out of practice.
Fragmented payment to individual providers for their
own services is one of the causes of this sorry situation. A
solution for inpatient and similar care that can work in the
US environment is to bundle payments around an episode of
care. This new payment will be made to a CDT composed of
physicians, hospitals, and other professionals who will
provide the necessary services. They will decide how to pay
themselves and organize care to both increase quality and
efficiency. The CDTs will demand better information on
patient outcomes and learn from other CDTs how to con-
stantly improve. Biomedical innovation will shift from
being cost increasing to being value enhancing.
The changes needed to move to bundled payments are
within reach. Some existing federal and state legislation
will need to be modified to allow the creation of CDTs.
Bundled payment could be done without reform of liability
laws, but enacting the type of malpractice reform suggested
above can help reassure physicians that well-intended
innovation will not unduly expose them to liability claims.
The underlying data to begin the implementation process
are available, but incentives are needed to pool the data
from Medicare and other payors. Medicare has begun some
relevant demonstration projects and these should be
expanded. Creating the new teams will require substantial
effort, so there should be clear guidance from national
leaders that the payment system will be changing and
incentives provided for voluntary early adopters. For
example, new CDTs might be guaranteed payments no less
than their present Medicare Part A and B payments with
exemptions from any future fee reductions, but the ability
for their payments to be adjusted upwards along with
everyone else. Academic medical centers might avoid their
troublesome service-by-service documentation require-
ments if they transformed their practice plans into CDTs.
A shift to episode-based payment will require a different
way of thinking about how care is provided and profes-
sionals are paid. It will require the development of
functioning teams that replace totally independent eco-
nomic entities. It offers, however, an economic basis for
creative approaches to medical care delivery that are based
on what works, yet adaptive to patient needs and scientific
advances. Not all the details of such a fundamental change
can be worked out in advance, but we cannot wait for the
perfect solution to our rising healthcare costs.
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